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 Abstract: 
This paper engages the Weberian view on the scholarly vocation from a 
perspective informed by ‘strong reflexivity’. The reflexivist perspective is 
grounded in a sociological understanding of knowledge that calls for a coherent 
reformulation of the relation between the social nature and social function of 
science, and of the cognitive and axiological posture of scholarship understood 
as socio-political praxis. Drawing on the sociology of knowledge, the paper 
argues that Weber’s perspective is untenable conceptually and practically. 
Strong reflexivity, here illustrated through Standpoint Feminism and 
Bourdieusian sociology, permits a coherent delineation of the problem of the 
scholarly vocation, in a way that reconciles the social origins, efficacy, and 
responsibility of science, and hence allows for a more realist reformulation of 
the cognitive, social, and moral dilemmas we face as scholars, educators, and 
citizens.  
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Introduction 
 
Ever since the professionalisation and institutionalisation of science its 
practitioners have reflected on the principles guiding their actions and defining their 
specific identity as a differentiated social group. Within Western social-science and 
philosophy, these discussions are often framed by the concept of the scholarly 
‘vocation’, following the influential perspective offered by Max Weber, whom 
sociologists claim as one of the founding fathers of their craft, and whose deontological 
position has had profound influences beyond sociology proper.  
This paper proposes that it is time for a post-Weberian perspective on the 
‘vocation’. Weber’s reflections accompanied the birth of sociology as an 
institutionalised field of knowledge, and as such offered useful problematisations for 
practitioners exploring the beginnings of their craft, understood as a systematic 
intellectual activity, but also as an emerging contender in the academic field of 
competing disciplines and in the larger social field of competing actors and discourses 
on reality. Sociology has now largely fulfilled its promise of illuminating important 
phenomena and dimensions of our social condition, including the determinants and 
constraints governing its own existence. We should therefore take stock of its insights 
and reconsider the question of the scholarly vocation accordingly.  
While this question has never disappeared from scholars’ concerns, localised 
socio-political crises and debates recurrently bring it to the forefront of academic 
discussions, thereby offering opportunities to reassess it in light of changing epistemic 
conditions and different social circumstances. Present concerns might be 
predominantly affected by such issues as the rise of ‘post-truth’ politics combined with 
a more or less implicit resurgence of the ‘science wars’, the colonial/imperialist 
character of university curricula, or the political targeting of intellectuals and 
academics in autocratic societies or in the seemingly liberal space of social media 
commentary.  
Empirically oriented social-scientists would consider that this diversity of 
scholarly contexts, conditions, and experiences provides important grounding for a 
general, theoretical understanding of ‘the vocation’ as a socially multifaceted 
phenomenon. But simplistic conceptual frameworks that generate overarching, 
‘universal’ principles are tenacious and appealing to the academic tribe – not least 
because they contribute to the rationalisation of academics’ social identity from the 
inside-out, thereby providing a sense of normative autonomy. Reassessing such 
conceptual-normative frameworks on the basis of empirical social-scientific insights is 
therefore a necessary step toward the development of meaningful alternatives. 
From this perspective, the Weberian position is a natural starting-point and 
addressing it requires some analytical engagement with its conceptual premises. The 
paper argues in that regard that, as opposed to the a priori categories Weber employed 
as philosophical parameters for the discussion of the ‘vocation’, the sociology of 
knowledge and science enables us to envisage a properly sociological 
conceptualisation and treatment of the many dimensions of the vocation question. 
Specifically, it explores how sociological reflexivity illuminates this question in 
theoretical and praxical terms. The starting-point of reflexivity being the 
acknowledgment of the socio-historical and material situatedness/boundedness of 
(social-)scientific knowledge (Hamati-Ataya, 2014a), the question becomes: how does 
embracing this sociological fact, as an intrinsic characteristic of the social objects 
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“knowledge” and “knowing,” affect the core aspects of the ‘vocation’ as an intellectual 
and social praxis?  
To answer this question entails rethinking, beyond the classical philosophical 
and ideal-typical treatments of the problem, the links between different levels and 
realms of our scholarly praxis understood as a social condition. Reflexivity coherently 
unifies the ontological, epistemological, theoretical, and moral commitments of 
scholarship and reconciles them with its intrinsically social nature. The paper 
addresses these aspects by showing how reflexivity shifts the basis of the discussion 
away from the Weberian model and delineates new socio-cognitive problématiques for 
social-scientists. These are first formulated through two versions of ‘strong reflexivity’ 
(Smith, 2004[1974]) as developed and enacted by Standpoint Feminists and Pierre 
Bourdieu. They are further envisaged in the context of the recent attacks on French 
‘critical sociology’, now accused of having lost its objectivity, and having thereby itself 
become a ‘danger’ to society rather than its presumed saviour (Bronner and Géhin, 
2017).  
 
‘Science as a vocation’ and ‘the vocation of science’: The Weberian 
perspective through a reflexive lens  
 
Max Weber established an important framework for thinking about the 
scholarly vocation in his famous lectures on the vocations of science and politics, and 
more importantly in his treatment of the problem of values. Weber proposed a 
coherent axiology, wherein the ontological, epistemological-methodological, and 
normative statuses of values are clearly – specifically: analytically – identified in 
relation to one another. In what follows I argue that Weber nevertheless failed to 
develop a coherently sociological analysis of the vocation as a social phenomenon. 
 
The Weberian Perspective 
 
I begin with an exegetical effort that focuses on Weber’s lecture ‘Science as a 
Vocation’ (Weber, 2004[1918]) because of its referential status, and because it 
illuminates his analytical grounding of the problem as reflected in four core 
distinctions he makes, between ‘science as a vocation’ and ‘the vocation of science’; 
between the ‘external’ and ‘inner’ dimensions of ‘science as a vocation’; between 
science for ‘practical purposes’ and science ‘for its own sake’; and the distinction 
among three dimensions of the scholar’s social identity, namely, the scientist, the 
teacher, and the citizen.  
Weber begins with what he calls the ‘external circumstances’ or ‘conditions’ of 
‘science as a vocation’ in Germany (Weber, 2004[1918]:1-7). These are the institutional 
structures, rules, and practices governing the functioning of the German University, 
and all the constraints it thereby imposes on its members and their career. He then 
moves on to what he presumes his audience has been eagerly waiting for him to 
discuss: the ‘inner vocation for science’. Here, he starts with a seemingly sociological 
statement, according to which this inner vocation is ‘determined’ by the fact of 
‘specialization’. But he quickly shifts to a different register, speaking of the necessary 
elements of ‘passion’, ‘conviction’, ‘inspiration’, ‘talent’, and ‘personality’, which he 
posits as ‘preconditions of our work’ (2004[1918]:7-11).  
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In describing these preconditions that are almost entirely related to the 
scholar’s character and are dramatically contrasted with the harsh conditions he 
previously enumerated, Weber infuses a tragic tone that is further heightened by his 
statement of the core paradox of the vocation: because the destiny of science is 
‘progress’, any scientist not only has to accept that her work will inevitably become 
obsolete, but has to desire it, too. The real problem of the vocation, then, becomes 
intimately tied to ‘the problem of the meaning of science’ itself. Not the meaning 
science has for ‘practical purposes’, which is ‘to enable us to orient our practical 
actions by the expectations provided by our scientific experience’. This is meaning 
‘only for the practical man’. What is, rather, the meaning of science ‘for its own sake’, 
and ‘the inner attitude of the scientist himself to his profession?’ (2004[1918]:12). 
In asking this question, Weber signifies a shifting of the problem from the 
vocation for science to the vocation of science, indicating that individual, singular 
interrogations on the scientist’s attitude to her profession find meaning in the 
collective, social status of science. Here, Weber introduces ‘the disenchantment of the 
world’ as the existential characteristic of his (Western modern) age, namely, that 
condition which results from ‘the intellectual process of rationalization through 
science and a science-based technology’ that leads to the ‘knowledge or conviction’ 
that ‘we can in principle control everything by means of calculation’ (2004[1918]:13).  
This condition is lived at the individual, private level as a loss of the possibility 
of ‘fulfilment’, since ‘progress’ remains always beyond us, at a point ahead in infinite 
time, which renders it properly meaningless existentially. At the collective level, science 
has lost its ability to drive us towards a specific, ‘ultimate end’: while it was in the past 
thought to be the ‘path to true existence’, ‘true art’, ‘true nature’, ‘the true God’, or 
‘happiness’, these vocations have now been shattered. What remains, then, is the 
Tolstoyan acknowledgment that ‘Science is meaningless because it has no answer to 
the only question that matters to us: “What should we do? How shall we live?”’ 
(2004[1918]:17). 
Weber concludes with a categorical statement that draws, not on his socio-
historical assessment of the transformation of science and of its meaning/vocation, but 
on an analytical proposition concerning the relation between values-as-means and 
values-as-ends. Using the example of medicine, he posits that science cannot help us 
make a choice among value presuppositions (values-as-ends): while medicine’s 
vocation is to preserve life (a practical aim that can guide choices in terms of values-as-
means; but an aim that already implies the positive value of life), it cannot prove or say 
why life should be preserved at all, what the value of life itself is (2004[1918]:18). This is 
where Weber draws on his axiology to delineate the difference between the scientific 
and political vocations, and the scholar’s relation to ‘politics’ in the realm of two of her 
social identities – as a researcher and a teacher.  
Weber’s analytical-philosophical treatment of values is exemplified in what he 
posits as the difference and relation between the ‘analysis of facts’ and the ‘statement 
of ideals’ (1949b[1904]:60): the role of science is limited to the former, while the latter is 
the proper role of politics/policy. This brings us to the notion of Wertfreiheit (‘value-
freedom’) or more explicitly Werturteilsfreiheit (‘freedom from value-judgments’), a 
notion often mistakenly rendered as ‘ethical neutrality’ rather than the more accurate 
‘axiological neutrality’. Wertfreiheit requires that the scholar  
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keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including 
the “value-oriented” conduct of the empirical individual whom he is 
investigating) and his own practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts 
as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including among these facts evaluations made 
by the empirical persons who are the objects of investigation) (1949a[1917]:11).  
 
The reason for this separation is that ‘to judge the validity of…values is a matter 
of faith’, and the adherence to given ‘ultimate standards is [a] personal affair’ that 
‘involves will and conscience, not empirical knowledge’ (1949b[1904]:55, 54). ‘Ultimate 
standards’ or ends/norms cannot be logically deduced from our factual knowledge of 
the world – and surprisingly, it seems that for Weber this is so even for our factual 
knowledge of values-as-objects – and science therefore cannot guide our social praxis 
beyond the designation of how, if specific ends are preferred, then specific means can 
be successful in achieving them. Science cannot causally help us determine categorically 
what we should do or how we should live (i.e., what ends should be preferred) because 
‘the validity of a practical imperative as a norm and the truth-value of an empirical 
proposition are absolutely heterogenous in character’ (1949a[1917]:12). This is the 
famous Humean analytical principle that underscores Weber’s Tolstoyan posture.  
It is at this argumentative moment in his lecture that Weber raises the problem 
of politics in the academy. His concern pertains to instances of political activism in 
Germany that he finds problematic and dangerous. But Weber makes a general, a-
contextual assertion that is offered (and commonly interpreted) as absolutely valid: 
politics ‘has no place in the lecture room’, both ‘as far as students are concerned’ – with 
no further explanation – and ‘as far as the lecturer is concerned’ (2004[1918]:19-20).  
In the latter case, this is so for two reasons. The first is a direct consequence of 
the analytical distinction between factual analysis and normative judgment: ‘opinions 
on issues of practical politics and the academic analysis of political institutions and 
party policies are two very different things’. The second has to do with the very setting 
of the lecture room, where the lecturer enjoys institutional authority and the 
monopoly of speech: to allow oneself the freedom to express political preferences or 
promote specific political ideals, objectives, and policies to an audience that cannot 
respond because it lacks voice and authority (i.e., freedom, opportunity, equality, and 
security) is to abuse one’s position of institutional and contextual superiority 
(2004[1918]:20-1). Such expressions of value-preferences should, then, be restricted to 
that space where egalitarian mutual engagement, argumentation, and dialogue are 
(again, ideally) possible, namely, the space of public debate, the proper realm of political 
action. 
The domain of politics, then, is ideal-typically mutually exclusive with two of 
the three domains defining the scholar’s social situation: research (knowledge-
production) and teaching (knowledge-transmission). Politics is antagonistic to the 
scientific ethos and it is only in the realm of citizenship, so to speak, that the scholar 
can practice an explicit engagement with values-as-ends. This, Weber himself did 
extensively and passionately, as attested by his participation in several political 
debates and struggles of his time. Weber was, in contemporary parlance, a public 
intellectual – and one of the most prominent in Germany, too.  
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Reflexivity 
 
In general terms, sociological reflexivity is an epistemological and praxical 
posture informed by the sociology of knowledge. The sociology of knowledge 
acknowledges and interrogates the relations between the forms and content of thought 
on the one hand, and the material-ideational social conditions that preside over its 
emergence on the other (Mannheim, 1936, 1952; Scheler, 1980). It empirically shows 
how the very categories of our understanding (of reality) are themselves the products 
of social reality (Durkheim, 1915; Durkheim and Mauss, 2010; Mannheim, 1952; Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966; Bloor, 1976; Sohn-Rethel, 1978), and that the way these categories 
come into being and acquire epistemic meaning is related to our social condition and 
situation, but also to our very engagement with the social world  (Mannheim, 1952, 
1986; Barnes, 1974, 1976; Bourdieu, 1977, 1990[1980], 2002[1984]).  
This is not the kind of engagement we describe in our methodology textbooks 
and transmit to students as normative steps for the ‘conduct of inquiry’. It is rather an 
engagement grounded in our social experience of reality, which is never systematically 
apparent to us because it is precisely the medium through which the social order 
becomes inscribed in us (internalised, naturalised), thereby appearing as a “given” to 
our consciousness (Bourdieu, 1977, 1990[1980], 2002[1984]; Bourdieu et al., 1983[1968]). 
To unmask what is hidden from our conscious experience of the world and how it 
shapes the very tools and representations we use to make sense of the world is the 
overarching mission of the sociology of knowledge. Reflexivity, then, is the posture of 
the knowledge-producer who draws on the sociology of knowledge as a source of 
understanding and a principle for her epistemological, methodological, and ethical 
reflection and practice.  
How does reflexivity, thus understood, illuminate the problem of the scholarly 
vocation? The first requirement of a reflexivist treatment of this question is that it 
should be addressed sociologically as any other social question. In Weber’s account, 
both the ‘vocation’ and the ‘meaning’ of science are addressed in philosophical, a 
priori terms, in relation to values-as-norms or ‘ultimate ends’. Consequently, Weber 
has to make a formal distinction between ‘science for practical reasons’ and ‘science 
for its own sake’. The paradox resulting from his ‘disenchanted’ analysis is that science 
only has meaning for practical purposes governed by ultimate ends set by exogenous 
actors in the realm of politics, but has no meaning for its own sake outside of the inner 
dedication to a necessarily contextual truth whose meaning is condemned to be 
superseded with time. Specifically, the paradox is that Weber acknowledges only 
partially and asymmetrically the existential and praxical conditions of science: the 
same social condition that endows political actors with a choice among ultimate ends 
that give meaning, for them, to the purpose of science, is denied as a source of meaning 
for scholars qua social actors.  
The only explanation for this oddity is that Weber imposes an a priori principle 
that implicitly posits that the purpose of science cannot be objectivated similarly, i.e., 
in equally sociological terms, for those placed inside and outside of it. This 
presupposition, in turn, is not based on a sociological understanding of science as a 
social product/phenomenon, but on Weber’s analytical distinction between analysis 
and opinion, or between explanation and value-judgment – a distinction he asserts 
independently of any empirical investigation of how explanations and value-
judgments are actually constituted in the processes of social and academic life. Outside 
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of science, social agents can cope with the disenchantment of the world because they 
can adjust to any historical loss of meaning by creating meaning out of their extant 
condition. But science remains trapped in a predefined, abstract rule that extracts it 
from the social condition that makes it possible, thereby making it hermetic to any 
meaning-producing dynamics, and impotent toward the formulation of the social ends 
that define its own practical purpose. 
To rethink this question as a properly social one amenable to sociological 
analysis, one needs to step out of the Weberian rationale and follow a coherent path 
that takes us from the reality of knowledge/science to the problématiques this reality 
brings forth. To adopt the reflexive posture is to start from the ‘ideological’ nature of 
thought and knowledge, in the Mannheimian sense of ‘total-ideology’: the ‘ideology of 
an age or of a concrete historico-social group,…when we are concerned with the 
characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of 
this group’ (Mannheim, 1936:56). As mentioned previously, Weber divorces scholarly 
practice from the conditions that produce any social practice. This puts scholarship in 
a social vacuum (‘science for its own sake’) and renders it incapable of finding 
exogenous meaning to its existence. The dilemma that emerges from Weber’s analysis, 
then, is specific to his portrayal of the scholarly condition, which is based on his 
analytical treatment of the relation to values. Going back to this treatment, it is easy to 
show how a reflexivist approach creates an altogether different perspective.  
Let me quote, again, Weber’s statement on Wertfreiheit: the scholar should  
 
keep unconditionally separate the establishment of empirical facts (including 
the “value-oriented” conduct of the empirical individual whom he is 
investigating) and his own practical evaluations, i.e., his evaluation of these facts 
as satisfactory or unsatisfactory (including among his facts evaluations made by 
the empirical persons who are the objects of investigation).  
 
Well, let us read Weber’s quote reflexively: what happens when we apply his 
verstehende sociology to the scholar herself, i.e., to her ‘value-oriented’ scholarly ‘conduct’ 
as encompassing the different aspects of scholarship, including thought as such? To 
establish the ‘empirical facts’ about our value-oriented conduct is to engage in the 
sociology of knowledge. But such an engagement with the very values that orient our 
work can hardly remain ‘unconditionally separate’ from our ‘practical evaluations’ of 
those values, which are themselves the products of our social condition. This is so 
because once our unconscious motivations are unmasked to our consciousness 
through our very pursuit of ‘empirical knowledge’ (i.e., sociology) they are necessarily 
meant to affect our ‘will and conscience’.  
More importantly, ‘will and conscience’ are themselves the product of 
socialisation, which is why by subjecting our own thought to a reflexive investigation 
we are simultaneously turning our individual ‘judgments on the validity of values’ into 
objects of ‘empirical knowledge’. In doing so we are simultaneously led to interrogate 
the social origins and collective character of our value-oriented scholarly conduct, 
beyond the individual “biases” and preferences with which Weber was rightly 
concerned. This collective dimension is more important than the individual one, for if 
we can easily be made aware of our individual biases through confrontation with facts 
or with the biases of others, those biases that constitute collective consensus (so-called 
intersubjective agreement, especially the epistemic/epistemological kind) are better 
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hidden/legitimised and more profoundly detrimental to the advancement of (social-
)scientific knowledge.  
On this point, Weber’s description of the ‘external conditions’ and ‘inner 
preconditions’ of the ‘vocation for science’ precisely ignores the most crucial, social 
dimensions of the problem. First, sociological analyses of the ‘inner’ characteristics of 
the scholarly ‘disposition’ demonstrate that such a disposition is socially constituted, 
and that the very categories Weber uses (e.g. ‘talent’, ‘dedication’) are conceptualised 
along an idealist, a-social understanding of the social personality, and hence 
unknowingly reinforce the ideologically dominant meritocratic view that practically 
and symbolically works in favour of the socially dominant (Bourdieu, 2002[1984]; 
Bourdieu and Passeron, 1964). Second, Weber’s ‘external conditions’ ignore the wider 
social determinants that make possible and shape the social character and status of 
science, as well as scientists’ professional dispositions. What is consequently missing 
from Weber’s description of the ‘external’ and ‘inner’ aspects of the vocation is 
precisely that which connects them socially, rather than opposes them analytically. And 
this is directly linked to Weber’s separation of the individual and collective experiences 
of the scholarly condition, that is, to his non-sociological treatment of ‘science as a 
vocation’. 
The reflexive posture consequently also contrasts with Weber’s analysis of the 
practical dimension of the vocation, related to the place of politics in teaching and the 
political nature of pedagogy. Whether one practices her craft in a magisterial lecture 
hall where students gather silently to listen to her authoritative voice, or in a classroom 
where students actively and freely engage with her and the material at hand, a 
reflexive perspective that aims at unmasking that which our thought, knowledge, and 
teaching practices owe to their being socially situated/constituted suggests that 
Weber’s position needs to be turned on its head, for it cannot be sustained without a 
heavy dose of obliviousness, hypocrisy, or sociological incoherence.  
Such incoherence is explicitly targeted within ‘critical pedagogy’, which takes 
stock of the insights of Marxist, feminist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial sociologies 
(Denzin, 2003; Freire, 2013; Giroux, 2011; Leonardo, 2005). Regardless of whether the 
thematic subject of instruction relates to politics explicitly, it is no longer possible to 
avoid the examination of the total-ideological and political dimensions of epistemic 
objects and practices, from concepts, theories, and paradigms, to epistemologies and 
methodologies, and the curriculum itself. Such reflexive approaches show that ‘politics’ 
is de facto in the classroom because the classroom is a socially constituted, socially 
authorised, and socially maintained space, and that to avoid ‘politics’ prescriptively 
neither removes its presence and impact, nor provides any guarantee of ‘objectivity’, 
‘neutrality’, or epistemological ‘rigour’.  
By leaving existing political orders and consensuses thus unexamined and 
hence incontestable, a Weberian position can even end up legitimating them by 
providing an implicit acquiescence to their symbolic power/violence and practical 
authority. A reflexivist pedagogy that would complement the epistemological-
methodological posture associated with ‘unmasking’ or ‘deconstructing’ techniques 
would rather require a very frontal and methodical engagement with, and 
examination of, ‘politics’ and total-ideology, including those involved in the teaching-
learning interaction itself. 
A reflexivist sociological analysis reveals that both our epistemic and political 
relation to reality is mediated by our socially constituted experience of the social world, 
	   9	  
and hence a reflexive pedagogy requires a critical engagement with that experience, 
which needs to be manifested and enunciated before it can be unmasked or 
deconstructed. The point, however, is that this experience is not simply directly 
accessible to us in any immediate or objective terms: it is fundamentally expressed and 
enacted in our value-preferences/judgments, precisely because they are the end-
product of the impact of the social order on our situated experience of it. For this 
reason, a systematic engagement with political values as epistemic objects of analysis is 
necessary and requires first to bring politics (back) into the classroom, however tricky 
and problematic this move might be – reflexivity produces not an unproblematic, but a 
differently problematised perspective on the vocation. 
 
“Strong reflexivity”: Knowledge as situated, purposeful praxis 
 
Weber’s justification for keeping ‘politics’ out is incoherent because it is 
grounded in a priori philosophical categories of analysis rather than empirically 
informed sociological ones; it is incomplete because by failing to apply systematically 
Weber’s own sociological approach to values, it misses its praxical and normative 
implications. The following sections delineate a reflexivist alternative through an 
account of ‘strong reflexivity’, which takes the insights of sociological analysis 
seriously as empirical foundations for conceptualising scientific thought and praxis.  
I first show that a sociology-of-knowledge perspective illuminates the necessary 
convergence of the unmasking of total-ideology with the redefinition of purposeful 
(rather than neutral) objectivity and praxis, thereby reversing Weber’s analytical 
separation of knowledge on the one hand, and judgment and action on the other. This 
is illustrated through Standpoint Feminist sociology and the sociology of Pierre 
Bourdieu. Taking the special case of social policies on science itself, I then discuss the 
relation between reflexivist knowledge and political engagement, by contrasting the 
tenets of the reflexivist posture with Weber’s untenable position on social ‘ideals’. This 
is then practically addressed in relation to the current debate on the social role of 
‘critical sociology’.  
 
‘Strong objectivity’ as the corollary of the situatedness of knowledge 
 
Standpoint Feminist and Bourdieusian sociologies are based on a powerful 
critique of objectivism/positivism, grounded in a sociological understanding of the 
social situatedness/boundedness of knowledge and the social constitution of knowing 
subjects. Their commitment to reflexivity is also directly related to their ontological 
position, since it results from a consistent investigation of (social-)scientific knowledge 
as one instance of socially-situated knowledge, and of the scholarly subject as one 
instance of socially-constituted subjectivity (Harding, 2004; Haraway, 2004[1991]; 
Bourdieu, 1992, 2000[1972], 2007).  
Their critiques of objectivist theory and practice similarly aim to show how 
objectivism is itself the oblivious product of total-ideology, and how by ignoring its 
social origins and the conditions of its social meaning and efficacy, objectivism merely 
enunciates, legitimates, and contributes to maintaining and reproducing extant social 
(power-)dynamics. Objectivism, then, fails to describe, understand, or explain the 
world ‘as it is’, despite its claims to be doing just that: objectivism’s objectivity is a 
‘weak objectivity’ (Harding, 2004[1993]) that leaves unexamined (and hence illusory) its 
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posture of epistemological distanciation/detachment. Through its erasure of the 
question of the conditions of possibility and meaningfulness of social representation, 
objectivism also imposes a false (total-ideological) distinction between theoretical and 
practical knowledge, and thereby ignores the praxical meaning social agents invest in 
their representations and behaviour in the social world; it consequently remains 
oblivious to the social determinants of the practices that are invested in, and produced 
by, its own representations (Bourdieu, 1990[1980]).  
Instead of surrendering to total-ideology by falling into a defeated relativism or 
endorsing an epistemic nihilism that renders science impossible and meaningless as a 
socio-moral endeavour, Standpoint Feminism and Bourdieusian sociology are on the 
contrary committed to a ‘strong objectivity’ (Haraway, 2004[1991]; Harding, 2004[1993]), 
which signifies their commitment to reclaim objectivity against its appropriation by 
positivism/objectivism and its denigration by postmodernists and epistemic/moral 
nihilists. This aligns with Mannheim’s (1936:5) view that: 
 
Only as we succeed in bringing into the area of conscious and explicit 
observation the various points of departure and of approach to the facts which 
are current in scientific as well as popular discussion, can we hope, in the 
course of time, to control the unconscious motivations and presuppositions 
which, in the last analysis, have brought these modes of thought into existence. 
A new type of objectivity in the social sciences is attainable not through the 
exclusion of evaluations but through the critical awareness and control of them.  
 
Reflexivity, then, is neither a logical or formal “bending back” of thought on 
itself (e.g. Ashmore, 1989; Woolgar, 1988), nor a solipsistic, introspective posture that 
turns the individual subject into an epistemic source of knowledge (Macbeth, 2001; 
Hamati-Ataya, 2014b). The “bending back” is rather reflected as a ‘causal symmetry’:  
 
The fact that subjects of knowledge are embodied and socially located has the 
consequence that they are not fundamentally different from objects of 
knowledge. We should assume causal symmetry in the sense that the same 
kinds of social forces that shape objects of knowledge also shape (but do not 
determine) knowers and their scientific projects. (Harding, 2004[1993]:133).  
 
Reflexivity thereby carries the social-situatedness of knowledge from ontology to 
epistemology, methodology, and theory. It guides the cognitive process through a 
cautious deconstruction of the taxonomies that constitute the foundations of our 
systems of thought and reinforce their social credibility. As Bourdieu (2004:89; 
emphasis added) puts it: 
 
Understood as the effort whereby social science, taking itself for its object, uses 
its own weapons to understand and check itself,…[reflexivity] is not a matter of 
pursuing a new form of absolute knowledge, but of exercising a specific form of 
epistemological vigilance, the very form that this vigilance must take in an area 
where the epistemological obstacles are first and foremost social obstacles.  
 
But precisely because knowledge is a situated practice that is performative as 
much as it is enunciative and descriptive, reflexivity is simultaneously adopted as a 
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political, moral commitment – a position Weber’s analytical model cannot 
accommodate. This commitment is not a choice one might or might not want to make. 
It is the necessary corollary of reflexivity as an epistemological standard. The 
connection between science and politics is manifested differently for Standpoint 
Feminists and for Bourdieu but it is essentially the same connection, “travelled” in 
opposite directions.  
Because Feminism originated in political struggle before becoming an 
academic movement, it carried with it the political purpose that prompted Feminists to 
interrogate the epistemic structures that serve to institutionalise and internalise the 
categories of thought through which gender-based oppression operates. As their 
investigation of knowledge and science developed, they became concerned with all 
such socio-epistemic dynamics of oppression (Harding, 2004). Bourdieu’s engagement 
with politics and power (Bourdieu, 2008), on the other hand, was a product of his 
sociological investigations: as social science reveals the forms of inequalities and 
domination that are masked by ideology, discourse, and symbolic violence, it performs 
a political act of subversion of that social order to which it is itself subjected. Reflexivity 
becomes a political and moral posture because the scholar can no longer be oblivious 
to her own contribution to the performance of the social order, and insofar as reflexive 
social-science is emancipatory for the scholar herself, its beneficial effects cannot 
morally be withheld from the subjects of her investigations.  
Standpoint Feminist and Bourdieusian sociologies have therefore drawn the 
reflexivist conclusions that follow from Weber’s own requirement that sociology 
actively investigate the values, experiences, and practices of social agents as social 
constructs. They have simply expanded this requirement to the knowing subject 
herself. By doing so, they have incorporated the sociology of knowledge as a core, 
integral part of social-scientific research, thereby challenging the distinction between 
first- and second-order knowledge that enables philosophy/epistemology to still claim 
a ‘foundational’ and ‘arbitrating’ position vis-à-vis sociology and hence deny 
sociologists their potential and actual philosophical autonomy (Hamati-Ataya, 2017).  
 
‘Strong objectivity’ and political engagement  
 
From the reflexivist perspective, it becomes obvious that politics is inscribed in 
all acts of knowing, and that one cannot address this fact by a mere analytical 
separation of the realms of science and society/politics and a pragmatic separation of 
the scholars’ social identities. By distinguishing science and politics on the basis of an 
analytical distinction between the values of ‘truth’ and ‘power’ – science and politics as 
instances of value-driven rationality (Wertrationalität) – Weber distracts us from 
confronting the fact that the enunciation of truths about the social world is itself the 
stake of political struggles – a fact he implicitly acknowledges. The notion of ‘science 
for its own sake’ becomes meaningless both sociologically and existentially, and 
increasingly so as one’s understanding of the social determinants and effects of science 
broadens and deepens. The question, then, is not how to protect science from politics, 
but how to reconcile the political and emancipatory nature/effects of knowledge.  
What makes Standpoint Feminist and Bourdieusian sociologies especially 
appealing in that regard is that they resolve the problem emerging from the post-
positivist critique, by transcending the false choice between the Cartesian anxiety that 
searches for an illusory Archimedean foundation for knowledge, and the relativist 
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anxiety that results from the acknowledgment of the historicity of knowledge (Hamati-
Ataya, 2014a). They thereby embrace the cognitive-existential problem identified by 
Gramsci (1971:750) as inherent to social critique: 
 
If the philosophy of praxis affirms theoretically that every “truth” believed to be 
eternal and absolute has had practical origins and has represented a 
“provisional” value (historicity of every conception of the world and of life), it is 
still very difficult to make people grasp “practically” that such an interpretation 
is valid also for the philosophy of praxis itself, without in so doing shaking the 
convictions that are necessary for action.  
 
 Feminists, Bourdieu, and Weber have all been intentionally and intensely 
involved in social struggles. The fact that the first two have contributed to (and not 
merely used) the sociology of knowledge/science and have engaged the public sphere as 
political activists is not a coincidence. I propose that this link between the 
objectivation/unmasking of total-ideology and the expression of value-preferences in 
the public sphere (i.e. the causal link between understanding ‘what is’ and judging ‘what 
ought to be’) is the defining aspect of the reflexivist ethos. To illustrate this notion I 
address a special instance so as to better capture the general case to which it pertains. 
The special instance is involvement in the public sphere with respect to issues 
concerning science itself, which highlights especially well the inconsistency of Weber’s 
position on the relation between ‘factual analysis’ and ‘statements of ideals’.  
If the formulation of ‘statements of ideals’ falls outside the purpose of science, 
as Weber posits, then who should decide the policies that govern the social status, 
functioning, practical purposes, and ‘ideals’ of science itself? When Weber 
distinguishes science ‘for practical purposes’ from science ‘for its own sake’, he 
segregates its meaning for ‘practical man’ from its meaning for scholars, who are thus 
conceived as “non-practical” social actors. On this view, two possibilities can be 
envisaged. Either the social norms governing science and the academy are defined 
exclusively by policy-makers and others who are external to science, or scientists 
contribute to these definitions but exclusively in the realm of public debate, as 
ordinary citizens.  
The first case poses the problem of the social autonomy of science: its ability to 
function according to its own self-identified rules, stakes, and purposes, rather than 
those of exogenous social actors. The Weberian model would address this case by 
allowing scholars to advise policy-makers and political activists only on the basis that 
they have ‘empirical knowledge’ that can guide the latter ‘practically’, that is, 
according to a Kantian hypothetical imperative: if such and such are the social ends 
desired or determined (by others) for science, then such and such policies and 
institutions are to be preferred. This would still limit public engagement to those 
scholars who actually have that knowledge. Scientists are here merely professional 
“experts” at the service of decision-makers or their political contenders. The 
distinction between ‘factual analysis’ and ‘statements of ideals’ produces, then, a social 
division of labour between the two vocations.  
The second case is more akin to Weber’s own behaviour, since he was himself 
involved in political struggles. Here, the division of labour draws on the ideal-typical 
(not real) distinction between the two social identities, and the scholar serves as both 
advisor (to herself) and ideologue, but in two ideally (which is to say, illusorily) 
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separated social spaces. Presumably, this means that drawing on her own empirical 
knowledge (if she has it), the scientist determines the best means to achieve the ends of 
science she thinks best suited to the social situation. 
In both cases, however, there is, according to Weber, no causal link between the 
enunciation of truths about reality and the expression of preferences about it. The 
process of determining which ideals should prevail remains restricted to the 
evaluator’s ‘will and conscience’. This implies that in the second case where, say, a 
sociologist acts in the public sphere, there is nothing that obliges her to actually use 
her ‘empirical knowledge’ according to a means-ends rationale, since she, like any 
scientist (say, a physicist), can engage the public sphere qua citizen only, and 
determine her value-preferences independently of any (and anyone’s) prior knowledge, 
sociological or otherwise.  
In either case, this raises the question of how such ideals are determined. What 
makes ‘will and conscience’ produce such ideals, if not a given social experience and 
understanding of reality? In the special instance where ideals are about science itself, 
the Weberian paradigm becomes problematic and even existentially absurd. If one 
considers the knowledge produced by the sociology of knowledge/science, Weber 
basically tells us that our understanding of the social origins, nature, and effects of 
knowledge cannot causally lead one to prefer specific social-cognitive configurations 
to others. For example, becoming empirically aware of how given material and 
ideational social structures distort scientific knowledge in given ways does/can/should 
not lead causally to fighting such distortions within science itself, which would entail 
rethinking a whole set of ‘ideals/policies’ for science such as the social organisation of 
research, public curricula, or pedagogy.  
This principle annihilates the very rationale of social critique. According to 
Weber’s paradigm, one can merely empirically establish the ideological tenets and 
consequences of, say, ‘positivist’ or ‘colonial science’, and then go home and continue 
to operate within the existing paradigm until a policy-maker asks one how this 
particular scientific finding could help reduce socio-cultural inequalities and improve 
the condition of society’s less privileged groups. In which case, the scholar would 
probably have to suggest that this can be done by an alternative framework of 
knowledge-production that challenges not only the cognitive standards of the extant 
one, but also the whole socio-academic condition that sustains it and makes it socially 
efficient!  
This posture is absurd, to say the least. And it is not only intellectually absurd, 
but socially, too: for it is precisely the intimate relation between cognitive and socio-
political structures that produces the very total-ideology from which one thinks about 
knowledge and ideals for society. And this is so for scholars and policy-makers. In the 
case of scholars, it is unsurprising that positivism has thrived so well under the banner 
of Weber’s propositions: as illustrated by the history of American political science, it 
provided it with both the unconscious (total-ideological) conditions to ignore values as 
objects of study, and the justifications (‘ethical neutrality’ as ‘objectivity’) for a morally 
unaccountable public behaviour (McCoy and Playford, 1967; Somit and Tanenhaus, 
1967; Easton, 1969; Surkin and Wolfe, 1970; Gunnell, 2006; Hamati-Ataya, 2011).  
In the case of policy-makers, to expect them to determine the need to 
emancipate oneself from ideology assumes that they have become aware of it (thanks, 
perhaps, to a Weberian “expert”) and that they have interests in altering its effects. The 
naiveté and absurdity of such a position explains why scholars working on the 
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sociology of knowledge and science have so systematically taken their understanding 
of the politics of science to its natural sphere of action: the realm of public debates, 
struggles, and policies. 
 
Concluding remarks: The situated sociology of situated values 
 
The Weberian posture cannot reconcile our situated objective understanding 
of reality and our situated social praxis, a problem of which the case of science policy is 
merely one illustration. Standpoint Feminists and Bourdieusian sociologists are 
especially interested in the social norms governing the production and functioning of 
science and education, but they manifest their scholarly ethos in a range of social 
struggles. These are not randomly chosen. Feminists are active on issues concerning 
gender-based as well as other forms of oppression, marginalisation, 
disenfranchisement, and symbolic violence that operate in similar and interrelated 
ways. Bourdieu systematically refused to speak on socio-political issues about which 
he considered that he had no sufficient epistemic basis to form political judgments, 
and limited his public interventions to social phenomena he had investigated 
sociologically. These instances of activism are significantly different from the 
contemporary “expert,” the French “total intellectual” à la Sartre, or the public 
intellectual who intervenes on issues outside her academic expertise (e.g. Bertrand 
Russell, Noam Chomsky). 
The reflexivist posture, then, produces a distinctive and accountable ethos of 
‘political action’ that follows from the specialised understanding scholars have 
acquired about specific aspects of the social world, including science and the academy. 
On this view, an understanding of the structural processes of social life produces the 
moral obligation to improve the human condition whenever social determinants are 
revealed by sociological analysis to be contingent and transformable through social 
action (Bourdieu, 1990:14-15). Without this practical purpose, sociology would not be 
‘worth the labour of a single hour’ (Durkheim, 1984: xxvi). The reflexivist ethos thus 
translates as an ethos of social responsibility, connecting Weber’s ‘two vocations’ in a 
sociologically coherent, existentially meaningful, and socially accountable way.  
Such ‘moral obligation’ and the standards of life to which it assigns value are 
not those abstract principles about which moral philosophers speculate in 
hypothetical situations. They are social phenomena arising from social life processes, 
and their origins as well as the specific ways wherein they affect social reality can be 
understood through sociological analysis. Knowledge of them produces the possibility 
of judgment, and better knowledge leads to a heightened moral consciousness. As 
moral consciousness is itself a product of social life, an understanding of the latter is 
the only rational path toward the assessment of social ideals. This is precisely 
Durkheim’s sociological response to Weber’s speculative idealism: ‘a new purpose that 
science proposes to the will’; as sociology demystifies the sacred, it simultaneously 
carries the promise of a ‘science of morality’ – one that ‘does not make [scholars] 
indifferent or resigned spectators of reality’ (Durkheim, 1984:xxvii-xxviii). 
Whenever it abstracts itself from its historicity the reflexivist position, too, risks 
becoming a rigid, sterile analytical model. The emerging public debate1 among French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 At the time of writing (Autumn 2017), the debate is gaining prominence in French public (and social) 
media (Radio France Culture, Le Point, Le Figaro, Nouvel Obs) and involves a growing number of French 
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sociologists, triggered by attacks on critical sociology’s perceived ideologism and 
activism (Bronner and Géhin, 2017), vividly illustrates the point that scholarly praxis 
generates socio-intellectual problématiques that require constant socio-epistemological 
vigilance and assessment. The debate illuminates the entanglement of thought and 
practice, since the analytical opposition between involvement and detachment 
typically brandished as a normative divide partly translates, in excessively 
antagonising terms, broader divisions arising within the French academy – including 
within the Bourdieusian “stable” itself – in a wider context of socio-intellectual malaise.  
Once this dimension is captured sociologically two related points emerge. First, 
the meaningfulness of the social contexts wherein scholars’ epistemic and value-
oriented perspectives develop becomes erased in the process of their becoming model 
theoretical-deontological positions. This erasure of context reinforces the analytical 
authority of the misleading concept of ‘the vocation’ as referring to some universal, 
homogeneous condition. Weber’s intervention was a structural response to a 
particular socio-historical situation and resonates for others experiencing similar 
configurations wherein keeping ‘politics’ out might be the most meaningful normative 
choice. By erasing this contextuality Weber failed to examine the impact of his social 
context on the production and meaningfulness of his epistemic categories and 
dichotomies. A similar problem arises for contemporary ‘critical sociologists’ when the 
enactment of social ‘critique’ becomes anchored in pre-defined intellectual 
preferences rather than aimed at social consensuses, including the ones grounding its 
own socio-epistemic possibility and authority.  
Second, while the protagonists of the involvement-detachment debate have 
adequate knowledge to discuss social problems and their potential policy solutions (à 
la Weber), they are much less equipped to engage their moral and normative 
dimensions from an equally confident position that does not merely embody ‘leftist 
dogmatism’, ‘right-wing collusions’, or ‘Western imperialism’, as the common 
accusations have it. As opposed to general sociology and the sociology of knowledge, 
which have established themselves as convincing alternatives to idealist ontology and 
epistemology respectively, the sociology of values is yet to fully illuminate that domain 
of the social condition that remains under the authority of speculative ethics and 
religious doctrine. It is the co-development of these three sociological branches that 
would ultimately permit a coherent understanding of our ‘vocation’, which is the 
precondition for our moral autonomy.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sociologists and philosophers in addition to Bronner and Géhin, including Nathalie Heinich, Cyril Lemieux, 
Edgar Morin, and Alain Touraine (see: https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-journal-des-idees/la-
sociologie-est-elle-un-sport-de-
combat?utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#link_time=1506678228; 
https://www.franceculture.fr/sociologie/sept-peches-capitaux-sociologie-vieille-histoire); 
http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/idees/20170929.OBS5360/la-sociologie-est-elle-depassee-le-debat-gerald-
bronner-cyril-lemieux.html; http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/sebastien-le-fol/edgar-morin-j-invite-
bronner-a-me-lire-01-10-2017-2161240_1913.php#xtmc=sociologie&xtnp=1&xtcr=3; 
http://www.lepoint.fr/editos-du-point/sebastien-le-fol/alain-touraine-une-etude-du-sens-pas-un-pseudo-
sous-marxisme-30-09-2017-2161058_1913.php#xtmc=sociologie&xtnp=1&xtcr=4; 
http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2017/08/04/31001-20170804ARTFIG00243-nathalie-heinich-la-
sociologie-bourdieusienne-est-devenue-un-dogme-de-la-gauche-radicale.php) <visited 21 October, 2017> 
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